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TORT LAW-COMMON LAW NEGLIGENCE-LIABILITY
OF COMMERCIAL VENDOR OF ALCOHOL-DUTY
DERIVED FROM CRIMINAL STATUTE-The

Pennsylvania Supreme Court has held that as a
matter of common law a commercial licensee of
alcoholic beverages can be held liable for third party
injuries which are proximately caused by the sale of
alcohol to a minor.
Matthews v. Konieczny,

Pa.

,

527 A.2d 508 (1987).'

On December 8, 1979, Matthew Capriotti entered J-B Beverage
Distributors, Inc. and purchased a case of beer. 2 After purchasing
the beer, Capriotti returned to his car where he and James J.
Matthews then drove to the home of John Konieczny.3 After picking
Konciezny up, the three youths proceeded to drive around in the car
while drinking the beer which had been purchased at the distributorship. 4 At some point, Konieczny began driving the car, 5 and shortly
thereafter, he lost control of the car and struck a tree. 6 As a result
of the accident James J. Matthews was fatally injured. 7
The administrators of Matthews' estate filed suit in the Court of
Common Pleas of Delaware County, Pennsylvania.8 Separate claims
were filed against Konieczny, J-B Beverage Distributors, Inc., and
Paul and Gloria Berkowitz. 9 The claim against Konieczny was based

1. This is a consolidation of two cases.
2. Matthews v. Konieczny,
Pa.
, 527 A.2d 508, 510 (1987). At the
time of the purchase, Capriotti was seventeen years old. He was never asked for
verification of his age and he was not visibly intoxicated when the purchase was
made. Id.
3. Id. Matthews and Konieczny were also minors who had contributed
money towards the purchase of the beer. However, neither one had ever entered
the distributorship and neither had ever been seen by the owners or employees of
the distributorship. Id.
4. Id.
5.

Id.

6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Id. Paul and Gloria Berkowitz were the owners and employees
of the J-B Beverage Distributors, Inc. and were named as individual defendants in
this action. Id.
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upon his alleged negligence in failing to properly operate the car.' 0
The claim against J-B Beverage Distributors, Inc. and the Berkowitzes
was based upon their alleged negligence in selling alcohol to a minor
and failing to determine the age of a purchaser of beer. 1' Konieczny
filed cross-claims against. J-B Beverage Distributors, Inc. and the
Berkowitzes, who subsequently filed motions for summary judgement.12 The trial court granted the motions and the superior court
affirmed this decision on appeal. 3
The second case involved Freil's Beverages, Inc., a distributorship
4
which sold a case of beer to nineteen year old William McGee.'
Two six packs of the beer purchased from Freil's were consumed by
Richard Bradshaw, who was subsequently involved in an automobile
accident which injured Christina Mancuso. 5 Actions were instituted
against Bradshaw, Freil's Beverages, Inc., and the owners of the
automobile driven by Bradshaw.' 6 The trial court granted a motion
for summary judgement in favor of Freil's Beverages, Inc. and the
17
superior court affirmed.

10. Id.
11. Id. As part of this claim, it was alleged that J-B Beverage
Distributors, Inc. and the Berkowitzes had violated § 4-493 of the Pennsylvania
Liquor Code. That section states in pertinent part:
It shall be unlawful - . . . (1) for any licensee or the board, or any employee,
servant or agent of such licensee or of the board ....
to sell, furnish or give
any liquor or malt or brewed beverages, or to permit any liquor or malt or
brewed beverages to be sold . .. to any minor....
47 PA. STAT. ANN. § 4-493 (Purdons 1969). Id.
12. Matthews, 527 A.2d at 510.
13. Matthews v. Konieczny, 338 Pa. Super. 504, 488 A.2d 5 (1985). In
upholding the trial court's decision, the superior court relied upon the wording of
§ 4-497 of the Pennsylvania Liquor Code. That section states in pertinent part:
No licensee shall be liable to third persons on account of damages inflicted
upon them off of the licensed premises by customers of the licensee unless
the customer who inflicts the damages was sold, furnished or given liquor or
malt or brewed beverages by the said licensee or his agent, servant or employee
when the said customer was visibly intoxicated.
47 PA. STAT. ANN. § 4-497 (Purdons 1969).
The superior court reasoned that "the statute only speaks of customers who were
sold alcoholic beverages and who were visibly intoxicated ... . To find otherwise
would disregard the clear intent of the statute." Matthews, 338 Pa. Super. at 507,
488 A.2d at 7.
14. Mancuso v. Bradshaw,
Pa.
, 527 A.2d 508, 510 (1987).
15. Id.
16. Id. The action against Freil's Beverages, Inc. was based upon its alleged
negligence in serving alcohol to a minor and failing to determine the age of a
purchaser of beer. Id.
17. Mancuso v. Bradshaw, 338 Pa. Super. 328, 487 A.2d 990 (1985). The
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On appeal to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, the decisions of
the superior court were reversed.18 In confronting the threshold issue
with which the court was faced,' 9 Justice McDermott, writing for the
majority, relied heavily upon the court's decision in Congini v.
Portersville Valve Company.20 Justice McDermott rejected the licensee's arguments 2' attempting to distinguish Congini and stated that
they were not compelling because they ignored the underlying rationale of that decision. 22 The majority then concluded that the standard
of negligence per se adopted in Congini should be equally applicable
to a licensee who serves alcoholic beverages to a minor. 23 The court
reasoned that holding otherwise would impose a lower standard of
care upon those who sell alcoholic beverages than that imposed upon
the public at large. 24
After concluding that commercial licensees are negligent per se
when serving alcoholic beverages to minors, the court held that
licensees may not claim statutory immunity under section 4-497 of

superior court held that "without a showing that the purchaser was visibly intoxicated
at the time of the sale, no liability can be attributed to the licensee." Id. In
distinguishing Congini v. Portersville Valve Co., 504 Pa. 157, 470 A.2d 515 (1983),
the superior court acknowledged that the Congini decision was indicative of the
direction of the law. The superior court distinguished that decision, however, by
stating that "Congini dealt with a social host to whom § 4-497 would be utterly
inapplicable. The instant case involves a licensee to whom we have held that § 4497 does apply." 338 Pa. Super. at 332, 487 A.2d at 993.
18. Matthews,
Pa
, 527 A.2d 508 (1987).
19. Id. The court stated that "the threshold issue in these cases is whether a
commercial licensee of alcoholic beverages can be held liable for damages caused
by the service of alcohol to a minor." 527 A.2d at 511.
20. 504 Pa. 157, 470 A.2d 515 (1983). In Congini, the court held that a
social host who serves alcohol to a minor to the point of intoxication can be held
liable for injuries proximately resulting from the minor's intoxication. Id. at 163,
470 A.2d at 518. The Congini court adopted a standard of negligence per se with
respect to social hosts who serve alcoholic beverages to a minor.
21. Matthews, 527 A.2d at 511. The licensee made two arguments seeking to
distinguish Congini. First, it was asserted that Congini involved a social host as
opposed to a licensee. Secondly, it was argued that the injured parties in the present
case were not the persons to whom the alcohol had been served. In Congini, the
injured party was served the alcoholic beverages by the social host. Id.
22. Id. As part of the underlying rationale for its decision in Congini, the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court stated that liability should be imposed upon those who
serve alcoholic beverages to a minor "to protect both minors and the public at large
from the perceived deleterious effects of serving alcohol to persons under twentyone years of age." Congini, 504 Pa. at 163, 470 A.2d at 518.
23. Matthews, 527 A.2d at 511.
24. Id.

796

DUQUESNE LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 26:793

the Pennsylvania Liquor Code 25 when their "customer" is a minor.2 6
The court rejected the argument that licensees should be immune
from third party suits where the person served was not visibly
intoxicated 27 and reasoned that if immunity were granted to a licensee
who operates his business in violation of the Pennsylvania Crimes
Code, 2 such a decision would be irrational and contrary to public
policy. 29 The majority acknowledged the fact, however, that a commercial licensee may shield himself from potential liability by complying with the requirements of section 4-495 (e) of the Pennsylvania
Liquor Code.30
In a concurring opinion, Justice Hutchinson contended that licensee
liability should be imposed based upon the policy expressed in Article
IV of the Pennsylvania Liquor Code.3 ' Continuing, Justice Hutchinson asserted that the penalties and sanctions of the Pennsylvania
Liquor Code itself provide a better basis for imposing liability than
reference to sanctions within the Pennsylvania Crimes Code do.32 He
stated that a Congini form of analysis is not necessary when the
Liquor Code provides an adequate basis for imposing licensee liability. 33

25.
26.

Id. 527 A.2d at 514. See supra note 13 for the text of § 4-497.
Id. The court concluded that the term "customer" as used in § 4-497 of

the Pennsylvania Liquor Code was not intended to apply to minors. "[U]nless one
accepts the rather absurd idea that the General Assembly intended to include within
a statutory immunity those without capacity to legally engage in the described
transactions, one must accept the conclusion that the immunity was intended only
for service to legally competent customers." 527 A.2d at 513.
27. Id. at 512.
28. Act of December 6, 1972, P.L. 1482, No. 334, § 1. 18 PA. CONS. STAT.
ANN. § 6308 (Purdons 1983), as amended by Act of April 28, 1978, P.L. 202, No.
53, §7 (8), states: "A person commits a summary offense if he, being less than 21

years of age, attempts to purchase, purchases, consumes, possesses or transports
any alcohol, liquor or malt or brewed beverages." Id. See also 18 PA. CONS. STAT.
ANN. § 306 (Purdons 1983) which states: "(a) General rule - A person is guilty of
an offense if it is committed by his own conduct or by the conduct of another
person for which he is legally accountable, or both." Id.
29. Matthews, 527 A.2d at 514.
30. Id. at 511. See 47 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 4-495 (e) wherein it is stated:
"The signed statement in the possession of a licensee .

.

. may be offered as a

defense in all civil or ciminal prosecutions for serving a minor, and no liability shall
be imposed if the Liquor Control Board or the courts are satisfied that the licensee
acted in good faith." Id.
31. Matthews, 527 A.2d at 514.
32. Id.
33. Id. Justice Hutchinson expressed his belief that the Pennsylvania Liquor
Code was enacted with a deep concern for:
the protection of minors both from their own follies and those of their
...
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A dissenting opinion was filed by Chief Justice Nix. In his dissent,
the Chief Justice was critical of the majority's use of the Congini
decision as a basis for reaching their decision.3 4 Additionally, Chief
Justice Nix contended that the Pennsylvania Liquor Code itself
prevented the court from reaching such a result.35 The Chief Justice
concluded that the majority had overstepped its bounds by intruding
36
into a realm reserved exclusively for the legislature.
Justice Zappala also filed a dissenting opinion in which he criticized
the majority's decision as going beyond social policy and intruding
upon legislatively created liability.3 7 In addition, Justice Zappala
argued that licensee liability need not be commensurate with social
host liability because the latter is a judicially created liability where
the former is mandated by legislative enactment.3 As such, he rejected
the majority's reasoning that failing to impose liability on licensees
would hold them to a lower standard of care than that imposed
upon the general public. 9
At common law,40 there was no cause of action for injuries
sustained as a result of the sale or furnishing of alcoholic beverages
to a strong and able-bodied man. 4 The theory behind this rule was

contemporaries. It is readily foreseeable thatthe unlawful sale of beer to a
single minor carries with it substantial risk that the beer will reach and affect
others in the same age group and these concerns were addressed by the drafters
of the Liquor Code.
.Id. at 517. Like the majority, Justice Hutchinson was also constrained to believe
that the statutory immunity provision of the Liquor Code is inapplicable when the
licensee serves intoxicating beverages to a minor. In his opinion, an interpretation
of the term "customer", as used in the immunity provision, which would include
sales to minors, would render the provisions of § 4-495(e) meaningless. Id.
34. Id.at 518.
35. Id.
36. Id. Chief Justice Nix argued that the majority ignored a clear legislative
direction when they used Congini as a basis for their decision. In so arguing, Chief
Justice Nix stated: "The legislature has expressly preempted the regulation of a
liquor licensee under the Liquor Code .... At this late date I believe it inappropriate
for the judicial branch to intrude into an area where the legislature has attempted
to regulate all aspects of that industry." Id. at 520.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. See Bishop v. United States, 334 F. Supp. 415 (S.D. Tex. 1971), rev'd
on other grounds, 476 F.2d 977 (5th cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 911 (1973). The
"common law" refers to "Those principles, usages and rules of action applicable
to the government and security of persons and property which do not rest upon
any express or positive declaration of the will of the legislature." 334 F. Supp. at
416.
41. See, e.g., Cruse v. Aden, 127 Ill.
231, 20 N.E. 73 (1889); Klein v.
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that the consumption of alcohol, rather than the sale or furnishing
of it, was the proximate cause of any injuries sustained as a result
of intoxication4 2 Furthermore, injuries resulting from the furnishing
of alcoholic beverages were not a foreseeable consequence of the sale
and were viewed as being too remote to impose liability upon the
seller. 43 Consequently, an intoxicated person was responsible for his
own tortious conduct resulting in injuries to himself or third persons, 44
and recovery was often denied on grounds of contributory negligence. 45
It is clear that the common law courts were reluctant to impose
6
liability on a liquor vendor for injuries sustained by his patrons.
Not surprisingly, there was an even greater reluctance to impose
liability for injuries sustained by innocent third parties.4 7 In fact, it

Raysinger, 504 Pa. 141, 470 A.2d 507 (1983); see generally 45 Am. Jur. 2d

Intoxicating Liquors §§ 553-554 (1969) and 48A C.J.S. Intoxicating Liquor § 428
(1981) and cases cited therein.
42. See, e.g., Nolan v. Morelli, 154 Conn. 432, 226 A.2d 383 (1967); State
ex rel. Joyce v. Hatfield, 197 Md. 249, 78 A.2d 754 (1951); see generally 45 Am.
Jur. 2d Intoxicating Liquors § 553 (1969) and cases cited therein.
43. See supra notes 41-42 and accompanying text.
44. See, e.g., State ex rel. Joyce v. Hatfield, 197 Md. 249, 78 A.2d 754
(1951), where the Maryland Suprene Court noted: "Human beings, drunk or sober,
are responsible for their own torts. The law [apart from statute] recognizes no
relation of proximate cause between a sale of liquor and a tort committed by a
buyer who has drunk the liquor." Id. at 254, 78 A.2d at 756.
45. See King v. Henkie, 80 Ala. 505 (1876).
46. The common law rule of non-liability was qualified under special circumstances where a drunkard needed protection from his own follies. See McCue v.
Klein, 60 Tex. 168 (1883); Bissell v. Starzinger, 112 Iowa 266, 83 N.W. 1065 (1900);
Ibach v. Jackson, 148 Or. 92, 35 P.2d 672 (1934). See also 30 Am. Jur. Intoxicating
Liquors § 520 (1958) wherein it is stated:
However, the common-law rule is generally qualified to the extent of giving
a right of action against one furnishing liquor in favor of those injured by
the intoxication of the person so furnished, where the liquor was given or
sold to a person who was in such a condition as to be deprived of his will
power or responsiblity for his behavior, or to a habitual drunkard, or in
violation of a prohibitory statute. Moreover, liability is sometimes imposed
upon proprietors of liquor establishments for failure to exercise reasonable
care to protect patrons from injury at the hands of intoxicated fellow patrons.

Id.
47. There were a few exceptions to this rule, but they were usually limited
to the drunkard's immediate family. See, e.g., Skinner v. Hughes, 13 Mo. 440
(1850) (permitting a slave owner to recover against an innkeeper for the death of
his slave); Riden v. Grim Bros., 97 Tenn. 220, 36 S.W. 1097 (1896) (permitting wife
a cause of action against an innkeeper for his repeated sales of liquor to her husband
in violation of state statute); Pratt v. Daly, 55 Ariz. 535, 104 P.2d 147 (1940)
(permitting wife to sue for loss of consortium). See also Comment, Common Law
Liability of the Liquor Vendor, 18 W. REs. L. REv. 251 (1966).
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was not until the late 1950's that the common law began to recognize
4
a cause of action for third persons injured by an intoxicated person. 1
Although the common law rule was one of non-liability, there was
legislative liability in the form of "dram shop" or "civil liability"
acts which could be enforced in the courts. 49 Dram shop acts imposed
civil liability by creating a statutory cause of action which was
generally enforceable by anyone injured by an intoxicated person's
actions. 0 These acts were generally aimed at liquor licensees", and
judicial construction of these acts often resulted in evaluating the
52
licensee's conduct according to a standard of strict liability.
A significant judicial attack upon the common law rule of nonliability began to emerge in the late 1950's. Beginning with Waynick
v. Chicago's Last Dep't. Store,53 several jurisdictions began to impose
common law liability on commercial licensees for injuries sustained
by third persons as a result of an intoxicated patron's actions.5 4 In

48. See infra notes 53-57 and accompanying text.
49. Dram shop acts were created as early as 1853. See Strubble v. Nodwift,
11 Ind. 64 (1858). Today, there are twenty-one states which still have dram shop
acts. See Comment, supra note 47, at 252 for a listing of these states.
Some states which previously had dram shop acts have repealed them. Included in
these states are: Pennsylvania, see Schelin v. Goldberg, 188 Pa. Super. 341, 146
A.2d 648 (1958); New Jersey, see Rappaport v. Nichols, 31 N.J. 188, 156 A.2d 1
(1959). See also Comment, Dram Shop Liability - A Judicial Response, 57 CALIF.
L. REv. 995 (1969), for a discussion of the development of dram shop liability.
50. See, e.g., Pennsylvania Civil Damage Act, Laws of Pa. 1854, No. 648 §
3, repealed, 47 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 9-901 (Purdons 1969).
51. See Edgar v. Kajet, 84 Misc. 2d 100, 375 N.Y.S. 2d 548 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1975), aff'd mem., 55 A.D. 2d 597, 389 N.Y.S.2d 631 (N.Y. App. Div. 1976) (New
York Dram Act applies only to commercial licensees).
52. See Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts § 81 (Keeton 5th ed. 1984).
According to Prosser, dram shop acts are designed to "impose strict liability,
without negligence, upon the seller of intoxicating liquor, when the sale results in
harm to the interests of a third person because of the intoxication of the buyer."
Id. at 581.
53. 269 F.2d 322 (7th Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 362 U.S. 903 (1960). In
Waynick, the plaintiff was injured by an intoxicated motorist. Although there was
a civil dram shop act which was found to be inapplicable, the court nevertheless
concluded that because there had been a violation of a state criminal statute
prohibiting the sale of alcohol to an intoxicated person, there had been a breach of
duty giving rise to liability. The court premised this duty on the broad public policy
against serving alcohol to intoxicated persons. Id. at 326.
54. Many of these jurisdictions predicated liability upon the violation of state
prohibitory statutes, which were interpreted by the courts as imposing a duty upon
the licensee. See, e.g., Rappaport v. Nichols, 31 N.J. 188, 156 A.2d 1 (1959)
(violation of statute prohibiting sales of alcohol to minors gives rise to duty on
behalf of commercial licensee); Davis v. Shiappacossee, 155 So.2d 365 (Fla. 1963)
(violation of statutory prohibition of sales of alcohol to minor gives rise to duty);
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the landmark case of Rappaport v. Nichols," the New Jersey Supreme
Court held that a commercial licensee who serves intoxicating beverages to a minor in violation of a state prohibitory statute is liable
to third persons injured as a result of the minor's intoxication.16 The
court reasoned that these prohibitory statutes were intended to protect
the general public, as well as minors and intoxicated persons."
The judicial erosion of the common law rule was recognized in
Pennsylvania beginning with Manning v. Yokas.5 8 In Manning, the
plaintiff brought an action under the Pennsylvania Civil Damage
Act5 9 for injuries sustained as a result of a collision with an intoxicated minor. In holding the commercial licensee liable for the plaintiff's injuries, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court stated that the old
common law rule of non-liability was no longer applicable because
the term "any one aggrieved" as used in the Pennsylvania Civil
Damage Act encompassed third persons injured as a result of an
intoxicated person's actions 0 In McKinney v. Foster,61 decided one
Hutchens v. Hankins, 303 S.E.2d 584 (N.C. Ct. App.), review denied, 309 N.C.
191, 305 S.E. 2d 734 (1983) (duty upon commercial licensee derived from criminal
statute). See also Prosser, supra note 52, § 36 at 220, wherein it is stated: "The
courts are seeking, by something in the nature of judicial legislation, to further the
ultimate policy for the protection of individuals which they find underlying the
statute, and which they believe the legislature must have had in mind." Id.
55. 31 N.J. 188, 156 A.2d 1 (1959).
56. Id. The New Jersey Supreme Court noted that "Where a tavern keeper
sells alcoholic beverages to a person who is visibly intoxicated or to a person he
knows or should know from the circumstances to be a minor, he ought to recognize
and foresee the unreasonable risk of harm to others." Id. at 201, 156 A.2d at 8.
Therefore, the court noted, "Service to [a minor or intoxicated person] may also
constitute common law negligence." Id. at 202, 156 A.2d at 8.
57. Id. The court viewed the licensee's violation of the statute as a breach
of duty owed to the general public. As such, the court stated: "It seems clear to
us that these broadly expressed restrictions were not narrowly intended to benefit
minors and intoxicated persons alone but were wisely intended for the protection
of members of the general public as well." Id.
58. 389 Pa. 136, 132 A.2d 198 (1957).
59. Laws of Pa. 1854, No. 648 § 3 at 644. The act provided in pertinent
part:
"That any person furnishing intoxicating drinks to any other person in
violation of any existing law, or the provisions of this act, shall be held civilly
responsible for any injury to person or property in consequence of such
furnishing, and anyone aggrieved may recover full damages against such person
so furnishing by action on the case."
Id.

60. In reaching this decision, the court stated that an innkeeper is "as much
responsible for the accident as if he had stripped the gears of the car or had
damaged the steering wheel, which defects in the operation of the car were directly
responsible for the uncontrollability which caused the collision." Manning, 389 Pa.
at 140, 132 A.2d at 200.
61. 391 Pa. 221, 137 A.2d 502 (1958).
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year later, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that third party
injuries are a foreseeable consequence of serving intoxicating beverliable for
ages to a minor, and a commercial licensee may be held
62
intoxication.
minor's
the
by
caused
proximately
injuries
With the rulings in Manning and McKinney, the Pennsylvania
courts had effectively undermined the common law rule of nonliability. 63 However, after the repeal of the Pennsylvania Civil Damage
Act, 64 it remained for the Pennsylvania courts to create a basis of
third party recovery grounded in the common law. That decision
came in Jardine v. Upper Darby Lodge No. 1973, Inc.,65 where
recovery against a tavern was permitted by a pedestrian injured by
one of the tavern's intoxicated patrons. The Pennsylvania Supreme
Court held that when intoxication is the proximate cause of injuries
sustained by a third party, recovery against a commercial licensee
who furnishes the alcohol is permissible.6

62. Id. With respect to the element of foreseeability, the court made the
following observation:
"It is common knowledge that great numbers of persons, minors as well as
adults, drive automobiles (too many of them, unfortunately, while intoxicated),
and it was well within the realm of foreseeability that one illegally served with
intoxicants might negligently drive an automobile and cause injury to persons
or property."
Id. at 224, 137 A.2d at 504.
63. See supra notes 58-62 and accompanying text. In Manning, the common
law rule was diminished when the Pennsylvania Supreme Court rejected the notion
that the consumption of alcohol, rather than the sale or furnishing of it, is the
proximate cause of resultant injuries. In McKinney, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
then rejected the notion that injuries resulting from intoxication are not a foreseeable
consequence of the furnishing of alcoholic beverages.
64. The Pennsylvania Civil Damage Act was repealed by 47 PA. CONS. STAT.
ANN. § 9-901 (Purdon 1969).
65. 413 Pa. 626, 198 A.2d 550 (1964).
66. Id. By the time Jardine was decided, the Pennsylvania Liquor Code had
been enacted. Therefore, the court concluded that violation of § 4-493 prohibiting
the sale of alcohol to minors and visibly intoxicated persons was negligence per se.
Id. at 631-32, 198 A.2d at 553. The court then went on to note the following: "The
first prime requisite to deintoxicate one who has, because of alcohol, lost control
over his reflexes, judgment, and sense of responsibility to others is to stop pouring
alcohol into him. This is a duty which everyone owes to society and to law entirely
apart from statute." Id. at 631, 198 A.2d at 553 (emphasis added). The licensee in
Jardine had argued that the repeal of the Pennsylvania Civil Damage Act precluded
any recovery by a third party. The court rejected this argument, however, and noted
that "The repeal of the Dramshop Act did not wipe out the remedy which that Act
afforded victims of intoxicated persons." Id. at 631, 198 A.2d at 553. The court
continued by stating that: "When an act embodying in expressed terms a principle
of law is repealed by the legislature, then the principle as it existed at common law
is still in force." Id. (quoting from Schelin v. Goldberg, 188 Pa. Super. 341, 146
A.2d 648 (1958)).
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Matthews v. Konieczny 67 was decided on common law principles
of negligence. When considering the ramifications of this decision,
it is important to remember that this case was dealing with a
prohibition on the sale of alcohol to minors. Minors, as opposed to
adults, are not considered strong and able-bodied men in the eyes of
the law, 68 and a legislative judgment has been made that minors are
legally incompetent to handle the effects of alcohol.6 9 Furthermore,
there is a strong public policy behind the prohibition on the sale of
70

alcohol to minors.

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Matthews relied substantially
on its decision in Congini v. Portersville Valve Co. 7 In Congini, the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that a social host who serves
intoxicating beverages to a minor to the point of intoxication is
negligent per se and is liable for any injuries proximately caused as
a result of the intoxication.7 2 The Congini court derived the social

67.

See supra note 2.

68.

See Congini v. Portersville Valve Co., 504 Pa. 157, 160, 470 A.2d 515,

517 (1983). See also Orner v. Mallick,
Pa.
, 527 A.2d 521, 523 (1987).
69. Id. See also Pennsylvania Crimes Code, 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 6308

(Purdons
70. 1983).
This public policy is expressed in 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 6308
(Purdons 1983) as well as 47 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 4-493 (Purdons 1969).
71. 504 Pa. 157, 470 A.2d 515 (1983). Congini involved a social host who
had served intoxicating beverages to a minor at a party. The minor was allegedly
served to the point of intoxication, and was subsequently involved in an automobile
accident where he sustained personal injuries. It is readily noticeable, therefore, that
the Congini decision is distinguishable from Matthews in two important respects.
First, Congini involved a social host as opposed to a liquor licensee. And second,
the plaintiff in Congini was the intoxicated minor, whereas the plaintiff in Matthews
was a third party. While these distinctions are notable, the Matthews court found
them unpersuasive. The court disposed of the first distinction by finding that social
hosts and commercial licensees both owe a duty to the minor and public at large
not to serve intoxicating beverages to a minor in violation of the Pennsylvania
Crimes Code. The second distinction was not dispositive because, as the Matthews
court correctly pointed out, dicta in the Congini opinion did not limit liability to
injuries sustained by the minor.
72.

Id. at 160, 470 A.2d at 518. See also Orner v. Mallick,

Pa

,

527

A.2d 521 (1987), reaffirming the holding in Congini. The Orner court, however,
went one step further and held that the service of any amount of alcohol to a minor
is a breach of statutory duty, and an adult need not serve a minor to the point of
intoxication in order to be held liable for damages proximately caused by the minor's
intoxication. Id. at 524. For discussions on social host liability, See Note, 23 DuQ.
L. REv. 1307 (1985) and Comment, Denial of Social Host Liability for Furnishing
Alcohol to a Visibly Intoxicated Guest in Klein v. Raysinger: A Failure in Judicial
Reasoning, 23 DUQ. L. REv. 1121 (1985).

19881

RECENT DECISIONS

host's duty from the Pennsylvania Crimes Code" when it held that
74
violation of this statute constitutes negligence per se.
The decision in Congini was based upon considerations of social
policy and the legislative judgement that minors are legally incompetent to handle the effects of alcohol. 7 The Pennsylvania Supreme
Court noted that the prohibition against serving alcohol to minors
was an "obvious legislative decision to protect both minors and the
public at large from the perceived deleterious effects of serving
alcohol to persons under twenty-one years of age." ' 76 Therefore, the
court concluded, the basis of a cause of action against an adult is
the service of alcohol to the minor and not whether a particular
plaintiff is entitled to recover damages.77
The issue in Matthews - whether a commercial licensee of alcoholic
beverages can be held liable for third party injuries resulting from
the sale of alcohol to minors - had previously been decided in Simon
v. Shirley.78 In Simon, a minor had been served intoxicating beverages
at a bar and was subsequently involved in a fatal head-on collision
with a third party. 79 In denying recovery to the third party's estate,
the Pennsylvania Superior Court held that a liquor licensee cannot
be held civilly liable for injuries sustained by a third party unless his
customer is visibly intoxicated at the time of the sale. 0
Like every other state, Pennsylvania has enacted a prohibitory
statute which forbids the sale of alcohol to minors.8 ' There has been

73. Laws of Pa. 1972, P.L. 1482, No. 334 § 1. For an explanation of the
use of criminal statutes to impose civil liability, see Prosser, supra note 52, at 222.
74. Congini, 504 Pa. at 160, 470 A. 2d at 518. See also RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 286 (1965).
75. Id. at 161, 470 A. 2d at 517.
76. Id. at 162-63, 470 A.2d at 518.
.77. Id. The court pointed out that a finding of negligence per se does not
automatically entitle a plaintiff to recover damages. The finding merely satisfies the
plaintiff's burden of showing that the defendant's conduct was negligent; the plaintiff

must still establish proximate causation. Id. See also RESTATEMENT
§ 288B (1965) and Prosser, supra note 52, at 230.

(SECOND)

OF

TORTS

78. 269 Pa. Super. 362, 409 A.2d 1365 (1979). Simon was the first Pennsylvania decision to deal with this precise issue subsequent to the enactment of the
statutory immunity provision of the Pennsylvania Liquor Code. Id. See 47 PA.
CONS. STAT. ANN. § 4-497 (Purdons 1969).
79. Simon, 269 Pa. Super. at 364, 409 A.2d at 1366.
80. Id. at 367, 409 A.2d at 1366. In reaching this conclusion, the superior
court interpreted the statutory immunity provision of the Pennsylvania Liquor Code
as being applicable to both minors and adults. The holding in Matthews overrules
this interpretation. See Matthews, 527 A.2d at 514 n. 12.
81. See supra note 11. See also Comment, supra note 47, at 262 for a listing
of each state's prohibitory statute.
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a trend in recent years for courts in several jurisdictions to construe
these prohibitory statutes as creating a statutory duty on the part of
adults not to serve intoxicating beverages to a minor.8 2 Furthermore,
violation of these state prohibitory statutes is considered either neg84
ligence per se 83 or evidence of negligence of the offender.
A review of Pennsylvania case law reveals that there is a duty
owed to both minors and the public at large not to serve intoxicating
beverages to a minor."5 This duty may be gleaned from either the
Pennsylvania Liquor Code8 6 or the Pennsylvania Crimes Code. 7
However, it is clear that the Pennsylvania courts have repeatedly
held that violation of these state prohibitory statutes is negligence
per se which gives rise to potential liability. 8
The Pennsylvania Liquor Code imposes liability upon a commercial
licensee who serves intoxicating beverages to a minor.8 9 At the same
time, a licensee is granted statutory immunity from liability for third
party injuries unless his customer was visibly intoxicated at the time
the alcohol was furnished. 90 It is therefore a matter of statutory

82. See infra notes 83 and 84. See also Prosser, supra note 52, at 220 wherein
it is stated:
"The standard of conduct required of a reasonable person may be prescribed
by legislative enactment. When a state statute provides that under certain
circumstances particular acts shall or shall not be done, it may be interpreted
as fixing a standard for all members of the community, from which it is
negligence to deviate." (citations omitted.)
Id. See generally Morris, The Relation of Criminal Statutes in Tort Liability, 46
HARv. L. REv. 453 (1933); Morris, The Role of Criminal Statutes in Negligence
Actions, 49 COL. L. REv. 21 (1949); Williams, The Effect of Penal Legislation in
the Law of Torts, 23 MOD. L. REv. 232 (1960).
83. See, e.g., Congini v. Portersville Valve Co., 504 Pa. 157, 470 A.2d 515
(1983); Brattain v. Herron, 159 Ind. App. 663, 309 N.E.2d 150 (1974).
84. See, e.g., Rappaport v. Nichols, 31 N.J. 188, 156 A.2d 1 (1959); Coulter
v. Superior Court, 21 Cal.3d 144, 577 P.2d 669, 145 Cal. Rptr. 534 (1978); Sorenen
v. Olde Milford Inn Inc., 46 N.J. 582, 218 A.2d 630 (1966).
85. See infra note 88.

86.

See 47

PA. CONS. STAT. ANN.

§ 4-493(1) (Purdons 1969).

87. See 18 PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 306 and 6308 (Purdons 1983).
88. See, e.g., Majors v. Brodhead Hotel Inc., 416 Pa. 235, 205 A.2d 873
(1965) (violation of statute making it unlawful to sell liquor to a minor or visibly
intoxicated person is negligence per se); Smith v. Clark, 411 Pa 142, 190 A.2d 441
(1963) (serving intoxicants to a minor or visibly intoxicated persons in violation of
statute prohibiting such a sale constitutes negligence); Jardine v. Upper Darby Lodge
No. 1973, Inc., 413 Pa. 626, 198 A.2d 550 (1964) (serving intoxicants to a minor
in violation of state prohibitory statute constitutes negligence); Congini v. Portersville
Valve Co., 504 Pa. 157, 470 A.2d 515 (1983) (service of alcohol to minor in violation
of Pennsylvania Crimes Code is negligence per se).
89. See supra notes 11 and 88.
90. See supra note 13.
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interpretation as to whether the statutory immunity provision of the
Pennsylvania Liquor Code is applicable when a licensee furnishes
alcoholic beverages to a minor.
Legislative enactments in Pennsylvania are to be construed, if
possible, so as to give effect to all of the statutes provisions. 9'
Furthermore, it is presumed that the legislature does not intend an
absurd or unreasonable result by the enactment of a statute. 92 Applying these basic canons of construction to the Pennsylvania Liquor
Code, it would be inconsistent in several respects for a licensee to
be granted statutory immunity after serving alcoholic beverages to a
minor.
To begin with, a minor by law is incapable of purchasing alcoholic
beverages. 93 This legislative judgment leads to the conclusion that a
minor could not be a legal "customer" of a liquor licensee.94 Secondly, the Pennsylvania Liquor Code provides a separate, absolute
immunity provision against civil and criminal liability for a licensee
who makes a good faith effort to verify the age of those to whom
he serves intoxicating beverages. 95 It would have been inconsistent
for the legislature to have included minors within the statutory
immunity provision embodied in section 4-497 while at the same time
providing immunity from liability for sales to minors under section
4-495(e).9 Finally, it would have been irrational and unreasonable
for the legislature to have intended to provide immunity for a licensee

1 PA. CONS. STAT. § 1921 (Purdons 1969).
1 PA. CONS. STAT. § 1922 (Purdons 1969).
93. Pennsylvania law requires that a person be 21 years of age before he can
legally purchase alcoholic beverages. See 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 6308 (Purdons 1983).
94. See Matthews, 527 A.2d at 513.
95. See 47 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 4-495(e) (Purdons Supp. 1987). See
supra note 30 for the text of this section.
There are numerous cases which have held that this provision is the only available
defense to a licensee who serves a minor in violation of the Pennsylvania Liquor
Code. See, e.g., Commonwealth ex rel. Pennsylvania Liquor Control Board v.
Demangone, 212 Pa. Super. 308, 243 A.2d 187 (1968); Appeal of Charsuner Bar
Corporation 68 Pa. C. 382, 449 A.2d 106 (1982).
96. See Matthews, 527 A.2d at 517, where the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
stated:
[A] broad definition of the term "customer" which would include minors in
the immunity section, renders meaningless the provisions of section 495, 47
P.S. § 4-495(e), providing a licensee who inadvertently serves the minor with
a defense to any civil or criminal action if he obtains a certification in the
prescribed form by the minor that he is in fact of an age which permits the
serving of alcoholic beverages.
Id. (Hutchinson, J., concurring).
91.

92.
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when that same legislature has made a determination that minors are
97
legally incompetent to handle the effects of alcohol.
By concluding that the statutory immunity provision of the Pennsylvania Liquor Code is not applicable to a commercial licensee who
sells alcoholic beverages to a minor, it is clear that the Matthews

court was correct in its holding. 98 However, the court should not
have constrained itself to deriving the licensee's duty from the Pennsylvania Crimes Code. There was adequate common law precedent
which the court failed to even consider in reaching its decision. In
particular, Manning v. Yokas 99 and McKinney v. Foster'" provide
adequate grounds for the imposition of potential liability on a
10
commercial licensee. '
The holding in Matthews, which imposes a standard of negligence
per se on commercial licensees who serve intoxicating beverages to a
minor,'02 does not impose automatic or absolute liability.'0 3 The
element of proximate cause is still an integral part of the plaintiff's
burden of proof.1 4 Furthermore, a licensee is permitted to establish
the contributory negligence of a minor whom he serves.'0 5

97. See supra note 93.
98. The court held that as a matter of common law a commercial licensee
can be held liable for injuries sustained by third persons which are proximately
caused by the minor's intoxication. Matthews, 527 A.2d at 512.
99. See supra note 58.
100. See supra note 61.
101. See supra notes 58-63 and accompanying text. Although Manning and
McKinney were decided when the Pennsylvania civil damage act was in effect, the
principles set forth in these cases are now part of the common law of Pennsylvania.
See supra note 66.
102. Matthews, 527 A.2d at 512. The courts holding is consistent with the
national trend in cases such as this. See Rappaport v. Nichols, 31 N.J. 188, 156
A.2d 1 (1959); See also Matthews, 527 A.2d at 512 n.12 for a listing of other
jurisdictions reaching the same conclusion.
103. See Matthews, 527 A.2d at 511-512. Under this standard, it is the service
of alcohol to the minor which provides the basis for a finding of negligence. The
court noted that a finding of negligence per se merely satisfies the plaintiff's burden
of establishing the defendant's negligence. Causation must still be established by the
plaintiff in order for liability to be imposed. Id. n.4. See also Congini, 504 Pa. at
163 n.4, 470 A.2d at 518 n.4.
104. Id. In order to establish proximate cause in Pennsylvania, the defendant's
negligence must be a "substantial factor" in the resultant injury. See Majors v.
Brodhead Hotel, Inc., 416 Pa. 265, 205 A.2d 873 (1965).
105. Matthews, 527 A.2d at 512. Pennsylvania has enacted a comparative
negligence statute. See 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 7102 (Purdons 1987). See also Congini
v. Portersville Valve Co., 504 Pa. 157, 470 A.2d 515 (1983) (discussing the possibilities of establishing comparative negligence).
This aspect of the court's conclusion is difficult to reconcile with the substantial
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There seems to be little doubt that the decision in Matthews will
meet with opposition. It has already been contended by the dissenters
in Matthews that the decision is a judicial intrusion into the legislative
decision to regulate the liability of licensees. 3 6 Furthermore, it is
contended that the liability of commercial licensees is a matter of
legislative discretion'0 7 and that the social policies for imposing liability on licensees should not be carried over onto the mandate of
the Pennsylvania Liquor Code. 08 These arguments are unpersuasive,
however, because they overlook the long-standing and presently existing public policy of prohibiting minors from consuming alcoholic
beverages.
In light of the precedent which preceded the decision in Matthews,
it can safely be said that the decision is a consistent development in
9 The Pennsylvania courts have
the common law of Pennsylvania. 10
long adhered to the principle that the common law should grow and
adapt to the changing needs of society" 0 and the outcome in Matthews
follows in this tradition."' Furthermore, a decision such as Matthews
properly allocates the costs and risks which the consumption of
alcohol by minors inevitably creates for both the minor and the
2
public at large."
precedent which has recognized that the minor's contributory negligence may not
be established. See Major v. Brodhead Hotel, Inc., 416 Pa. 265, 205 A.2d 873
(1965), citing § 483 of the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORS. "If the defendant's
negligence consists in violation of a statute enacted to protect a class of persons
from their inability to exercise self-protective care, a member of such a class is not
barred by his contributory negligence from recovery for bodily harm caused by
violation of the statute." Id. at 876.
106. Matthews, 527 A.2d at 518. In his dissent, Chief Justice Nix stated that:
"The legislature has expressly preempted regulation of a liquor licensee under the
Liquor Code." Id.
107. Id.
108. Id. Justice Zappalla stated in his dissent that:
"The majority improperly overlays the social policy arguments which prevailed
in [Congini] onto the Liquor Code's specific limitation of civil liability of
licensees. Although the legislature may not have kept pace with the judiciary's
view of public policy, as the majority clearly wishes, it is not the court's
prerogative to compel compliance with its view."
Id. at 520.
109. See supra notes 58-63 and accompanying text.
110. See Comment, supra note 72, at 1124.
111. It is well-known that drunk driving has become a major concern in society
today. Alcohol is responsible for at least 50 percent of all highway deaths which
occur. See The Presidential Commission on Drunk Driving, Final Report 1.
For a discussion of liability to third persons injured by drunk drivers, See Comment,
Third Party Liability for Drunk Driving: When "One for the Road" Becomes One
for the Courts, 29 VILL. L. REv. 1119 (1983-84).
112. For a discussion on the particulars of this point, see Note, 22 DUQ. L.
REv. 1105 (1984).
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It remains to be seen what reaction the Pennsylvania General
Assembly will have, if any, to the decision reached in Matthews."'
The most prudent course of action which the legislature could pursue
would be to leave the common law unchanged in this area, or codify
the holding reached in Matthews. Of course, the legislature could
expressly overrule the Matthews holding or limit its applicability to
particular situations. In light of the strong social policies which exist
in this area, however, it would seem safe to assume that the legislature
will not, and should not, abrogate the potential liability which a
commercial licensee faces when he serves intoxicating beverages to a
minor.
Bryan D. Kocher

113. At the present time, the Pennsylvania legislature has taken no action to
abrogate the holding in Matthews.

